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Abstract
This paper employs a dynamic framework to compare the effects of al-
ternative government activities on convergence of industrialized economies
to the technology frontier. The government’s Instruments include facilitating
private investment and education policy. The latter enhances skills of het-
erogenous specialists and imply the decision on their respective shares. The
analysis distinguishes between an isolated policy of a single economy and co-
ordinated policies of various countries. Which policy maximizes the speed of
convergence is crucially affected by the economy’s state of development. A
policy switch between the mentioned instruments while catching-up may be
preferable.
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JEL: O31, O33, O38, J24, L261 Motivation
The term ’European Paradox’, which has been coined by the European Commis-
sion (1995, p. 5) in the Green Book on Innovation, refers to the phenomena that
"One of Europe’s major weaknesses lies in its inferiority in terms of transforming
the results of technological research and skills into innovations and competitive
advantages." Although the strength of this statement has been relaxed during the
last several years, there is broad consensus on the importance of human capital
or, put differently, skills lying beyond pure technological knowledge, for being
successful in innovation, growth and catching-up to the technology frontier. So
far, the literature on the role of human capital for convergence distinguishes two
sources of (national or regional) growth and hence for convergence of lagging
economies to the technology frontier: ﬁrst, innovation, which is assumed being
realized by highly skilled workers, and second, imitation carried out by lowly
skilled workers. However, this setting mainly describes the catching-up process
of developing countries. As long as a country is not caught in a non-convergence
trap, beginning with an imitation strategy and then, after having passed a certain
threshold level of development, switching to an innovation strategy ﬁnally leads
to convergence to the technology frontier (see e. g. Acemoglu et al. (2006), King
and Levine (1993), Audretsch and Thurik (2001); Aghion and Howitt (2009) as
well as Acemoglu (2009) provide recent overviews). The prominent role of knowl-
edge and hence of human capital as argued by Lucas (1988) is broadly accepted
as a major growth determinant which is most important in countries with scarce
endowments of natural resources. Especially in industrialized economies, human
capital frequently is considered as reﬂecting the stock of technological knowledge
as well as being a central factor within the innovation process that strongly should
be supported by the government. However, Krueger and Lindahl (2001), Vanden-
bussche et al. (2006) present a more sceptical view on the impact of education
policy for industrialized countries. So far the literature on the role of government
spendings in the context of human capital is not yet clear.
In contrast to this argument, the European Paradox highlights that being success-
ful in developing cutting-edge technological knowledge does not necessarily imply
economic success in the sense of determining the technology frontier. Obviously,
there are other skills lacking, which mostly are interpreted, e.g., as a basic under-
standing for the timing of an innovation, societal acceptance of a new technology
or just a feeling for the applicability of an idea in a certain economic environ-
1ment. Consequently, aside from pure technological knowledge, individuals have
to be endowed with additional skills. Besides, especially in the context of indus-
trialized economies as e. g. OECD countries, the pure distinction into highly and
lowly skilled workers is not apt to represent the state of the art of human capi-
tal. Although belonging to the economically most successful countries, there are
quite different states of development also among OECD countries observable. It is
reasonable to assume that the majority of individuals in these countries is highly
skilled but that there exists a broad variety of skills, each of them contributing
differently to catching-up. Usually, these skills are the outcome of speciﬁc educa-
tion policies which are strongly supported by government policies. A short look
at recent education indicators illustrates that across OECD countries governments
are seeking policies to make education more effective (see OECD (2009)). Instru-
ments, among others, are public spendings on education. In this context, not only
the absolute amount, but also its composition with respect to various applications,
impact on the success of investment in education and henceforth on growth and
convergence. Education investments are also of interest in the work of Blanke-
nau (2005) or Blankenau et al. (2007) who ﬁnd a positive relationship between
public education expenditures and growth for developed countries. Benhabib and
Spiegel (2005) provide an overview on the impact of human capital on growth.
A more general view on the impact of productive government expenditures on
growth has been well recognized since the seminal work of Aschauer (1990, 1989)
who focuses on infrastructure investment though the overall valuation of the stud-
ies is mixed. The basic theoretical framework was provided by Barro (1990)
and has been extended to include, among others, aspects like adjustment costs
(e. g. Turnovsky (1996)), congestion (Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) or Eicher and
Turnovsky (2000)), uncertainty (e. g. Turnovsky (1999)), open economies (e. g.
Turnovsky (1996, 1997, 1999)) or arguments regarding development (e. g. Chat-
terjee et al. (2003)). The distinction of the government budget in consumptive
and productive expenditure and its long-run implication has been addressed e. g.
by Barro (1991) or Turnovsky and Fisher (1995).
Aside from mere growth, a broadly accepted policy goal is to reduce regional
disparities, and public expenditure is utilized in order to achieve convergence. The
current regional policy of the European Union during the period 2007–2013 serves
as good example. The goal is to help lagging regions to catch up to per-capita
income of the most advanced country within the EU. Some basic mechanisms how
2a productive government input may affect the process of convergence within a
two-country setting can be found in Ott and Soretz (2010). They highlight the
crucial importance of the decision on the type of public input provided by the
government. Recent surveys summarizing the current state of the literature on
government activity and growth both from a theoretical and an empirical point of
view can be found by Romp and de Haan (2007) or Irmen and Kuehnel (2009).
Nevertheless, the relationship between productive government expenditure and
convergence still remains an unresolved puzzle.
However, being conscious about the growth enhancing effect of productive public
spendings the main question addressed in this paper is to determine those policies
that maximize an economy’s productivity growth rate in order to converge to the
technology frontier. For a given state of development, we especially address which
skills should be supported and how the composition of specialists at the economy-
wide level should be. The formal framework is a straightforward extension of the
model of Acemoglu et al. (2006) but in contrast to them here the focus is laid
on highly skilled specialists. Each of them is endowed with two types of skills
though to different extents and hence we distinguish between technological and
systemic specialists. An additional perspective of the analysis assumes that any
successful catching-up policy of a single economy will be adopted by others or, put
differently, that policy coordination between various countries leads to a uniform
policy of various countries. The phenomenon of coordinated policies may, e. g., be
observed in the context of the monetary policy of the European Union. However,
concerning ﬁscal policy coordination there exists some diffuse consensus that it
should also be coordinated but so far it is not yet close to becoming reality.
Given this background the paper analyzes the effectiveness of various policies that
act as enhancing economy wide productivity either via focusing on individual spe-
cialists or on their overall distribution. This is done by comparing the contexts
of isolated and coordinated governmental policies. These include increasing the
specialists’ investment opportunities, e.g. via relaxing credit market imperfections
thereby allowing for bigger project sizes. Since governments usually have to meet
a ﬁnancing constraint, the composition of a certain budget and thereby the chan-
nels through which government activity becomes effective is a major policy issue.
Aside from individual factors, like the skill endowment or investment size, also
the economic environment in which specialists are active, affects their individual
productivity. In the context of catching-up, two channels are of primary interest:
3First, productivity at the technology frontier that deﬁnes the state to which conver-
gence takes place and, second, the economic environment in which the specialists
are active as deﬁned by an economy’s state of development.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the model.
Section 3 analyzes the relationship between the specialists’ skills, their produc-
tivity, and the impact of government activity. The macroeconomic equilibrium is
derived in Section 4 while Section 5 begins with detailing the policy implications.
Sections 6 and 7 distinguish the consequences for the two frameworks of isolated
and coordinated policies and presents some selected simulations. Section 8 brieﬂy
concludes.
2 The basic framework
General setup: Like in Acemoglu et al. (2006), the economy is populated by over-
lapping generations of risk-neutral agents, who live for two periods and discount
the future at the rate r. Each generation is composed of highly skilled specialists
that are endowed with two types of skills though to different extents. Accordingly,
one might distinguish technological and systemic specialists.
Within the model, government activity may be interpreted as reﬂecting several
determinants of education policy. This includes the provision of a certain public
budget to ﬁnance spendings on education. Another component provides an indi-
cation for the emphasis as regards content of public spendings. This includes the
structure of the budget as well as the determination of the respective shares of
the heterogenous specialists. For the sake of simplicity, we assume growth neutral
ﬁnancing of the public input and that the public budget constraint is met in each
period.
Throughout the paper the analysis deals with different levels of aggregation which
interact and are linked to each other as follows: (i) the individual perspective of
single specialists which determines productivity at the ﬁrm level; (ii) the national
level which focuses on a country’s overall productivity. It is affected by the pro-
ductivity of single specialists as well as by their economy-wide distribution; and
(iii) the worldwide view which captures productivity at the technology frontier. It
is determined by the most productive country.
4Due to the various levels of aggregation one has to be precise about the distinction
between growth and convergence. From the perspective of a single economy,
growth is realized whenever an initially given distance to frontier vanishes over
time thereby inducing convergence country to the technology frontier.
Two sector economy and the role of productivity: The two-sector economy is com-
posed of a perfectly competitive ﬁnal product sector and an intermediate good
sector with imperfect competition. The ﬁnal good, yt, is produced using a contin-






(At(i))1−axt(i)adi, i ∈ [0,1], a ∈ (0,1) (1)
where At(i) is productivity of ﬁrm i in the intermediate good sector at time t. Each
intermediate good is produced by a technologically leading monopolist at a unit
marginal cost in terms of the ﬁnal good which thus is used as numéraire. Demand







where pt(i) is the price for intermediate i set by the monopolist. The monop-
olist faces a competitive fringe of imitators that can produce the same inter-
mediate good but at higher cost. This forces the monopolist to charge a limit
price, pt(i)= x > 1, in order to avoid competition by imitators. To secure that only
one monopolist is active for each intermediate it is assumed that 1/a ≥ x > 1.1
Given inverse demand (2) and the limit price, x, equilibrium monopoly proﬁts in
the intermediate good sector are
pt(i) = [pt(i)−1]xt(i) = (x−1)x− 1
1−aAt(i) (3)
Aggregate ﬁnal output is then given by
yt = a−1x− a
1−aAt (4)
with At representing the average level of knowledge in the considered economy at





1Broadly speaking, one can think of the parameter x as capturing competitive policies. Higher
values of x correspond to a less competitive market for intermediates and imply higher proﬁts for
the monopolist. This aspect and the corresponding implications are detailed in Acemoglu et al.
(2006).
5We assume At ≤ ¯ At, where ¯ At is determined by the most productive country which
represents the world technology frontier. Productivity at the technology frontier
grows at rate g and evolves according to2
¯ At = (1+g) ¯ At−1 (6)
The technological state of development of the representative economy at time t is
reﬂected by its proximity to the technology frontier and is deﬁned as
at ≡ At/ ¯ At (7)
In this context, convergence of an economy to the technology frontier is equiv-
alent to an increasing level of at. As will be shown, the main determinant of
growth and convergence within the considered framework is provided by those
factors that affect productivity, namely skills as well as their overall distribution.
Hence governmental policy which affects these parameters becomes essential for
convergence policy.
3 Highly skilled specialists and government activity
Specialists act in the intermediate sector at which productivity of a single specialist
at time t is given by
At(i) = st(i)
h






, r ∈ [0,1] (8)
Here, st is investment size; h(i) and g(i) denote time invariant but different skills;
¯ At reﬂects productivity at the technology frontier (global knowledge); and At is
the state of technology of a single economy (local knowledge), each at time t.
Government activity enters productivity of the specialist via the individually avail-
able amount of productive spendings, b, and their composition as determined
by the parameter r ∈ [0,1]. The latter parameterizes to which extent the govern-
ment budget lays emphasis on activities at the technology frontier or has a more
regional/local focus.3
2Throughout the paper, the growth rate g is ﬁrst assumed to be exogenous. However, in the
context of the macroeconomic equilibrium (Section 4) it will be shown how the equilibrium level
of g is determined by individual skills, the overall composition of specialists, and the amount of
the government budget.
3Due to the respective characteristics of productive spendings, b may be either the total amount
of public spendings given there is no rivalry, or public spendings per capita if rivalry is complete,
6As argued before, each specialist, i, in the intermediate sector is endowed with
two types of skills:
(i) Technological skills (denoted as h(i)), which reﬂect technological and scientiﬁc
knowledge and which could be understood as cutting edge skills in the technologi-
cal domain. These skills are linked to productivity at the technology frontier, ¯ At−1.
What we have in mind are, e. g., engineers or scientists that work at universities
or in research labs thereby having access to the most advanced knowledge.
(ii) Systemic skills (denoted as g(i)), which could e. g. be understood as being the
specialist’s skills with respect to management activities, communication and/or
networking. The reference point for systemic skills is national or local knowledge
(At−1) which includes the knowledge of the economy’s peculiarities, such as insti-
tutions, national tastes and preferences or region speciﬁc production factors. This
implies that a specialist’s systemic skills are the more productive the higher her
regional or societal embeddedness or the better her network contacts are in the
economic environment in which the specialist is active.
It appears reasonable to assume that specialists in industrialized economies pos-
sess competencies with respect to both technological and systemic skills although,
at an individual level, the skill endowments usually differ among individuals. As a
consequence specialists are heterogenous in the sense that they are characterized
by different sources of productivity.
As can be seen in (8), productivity of the individual specialist is enhanced by
government activity namely both by the amount (b) and the composition (r) of
public spendings. Given the benchmark case of r = 0, the total amount of public
expenditures enhance systemic skills thereby relying on local knowledge (At−1).
On the other polar case, i.e. given r = 1, the public budget supports technologi-
cal skills and hence beneﬁts from knowledge and productivity at the technology
frontier ( ¯ At−1). Intermediate values of r imply that the government’s budget is
divided in the sense that it supports both skills though to varying extents. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that there exist upper and lower boundaries for both
technological and systemic skills; ¯ h > h and ¯ g > g. Given these characteristics,
or something in-between given partial rivalry. However, this paper does not address issues of
congestion as discussed, e. g., by Fisher and Turnovsky (1998).





















Depending upon the prevailing skill advantage, the two types of actors are hence-
















Figure 1: Technological and systemic specialists
Figure 1 illustrates the embedding of an individual specialist in an international
context where the horizontal axis at−1 could be interpreted as reﬂecting the state
of development of the considered economy. The position of a single specialist,
however, is given by the individual’s distance to frontier, At(i)/ ¯ At−1, which is de-
picted at the vertical axis. Accordingly, Figure 1 illustrates the relative position of
a systemic and a technological specialist as functions of the state of economic de-
velopment in which the respective specialist acts. Both functions are derived by di-
viding individual productivities of technological and systemic specialists from (9a)
and (9b) by productivity at the technology frontier, ¯ At−1. In case of identical in-




≡ ˜ a (10)
4Given identical investment sizes of both specialists, ˜ a ≤ 1 only if ¯ h−h ≤ ¯ g−g. This implies
that technological skills are less spread than systemic skills, an assumption which is quite plausible
within developed countries. It is assumed that this parameter restriction holds throughout the
paper.
8It becomes apparent that, as long as at−1 < ˜ a, at an individual level, technologi-
cal specialists are more productive while, in contrast, systemic specialists have a
higher productivity if the state of development of a country exceeds ˜ a. This reﬂects
the fact that, all other things being equal, the marginal productivity of technolog-
ical specialists – and thus their marginal contribution to growth and convergence
of the economy as a whole – is declining the more the economy approaches the
technology frontier. The opposite is true for systemic specialists. Their marginal
productivity increases – at least in relative terms – the closer the economy is to the
technology frontier.5



















This growth rate also drives convergence of the economy to the technology fron-
tier. It becomes obvious that both types of skills contribute to this convergence
process, though to different extents, depending upon the economy’s state of devel-
opment. As long as it is far away from the technology frontier technological skills
strongly contribute to the growth rate of the aggregate technology.6 Accordingly,
technological skills are the major forces that drive growth of national productivity
and with this also convergence to the technology frontier. All other things being
equal, the growth rate of national productivity declines while catching-up:7 As a
country converges to the technology frontier, technological skills become relatively
less important while systemic skills become relatively more important.
As argued before, the government’s activity may affect convergence via enhancing
individual productivity. The crucial policy parameters in this context are amount
and structure of the public budget. Notice that its impact on convergence declines
as an economy develops thereby following the same logic as in the context of the
declining relative importance of technological skills (see (11)).
5Notice that, aside from the introduction of productive government activity, this implication
is a major difference of our paper to the one of Acemoglu et al. (2006) where, given the case of
’low-skill entrepreneurs’, the value of g(i) becomes zero. In their model entrepreneurs might be dis-
tinguished in high-skill and low-skill entrepreneurs. Productivity of the latter falls short of produc-
tivity of high-skill entrepreneurs for all states of development, i.e. there exists a clear productivity
ranking between the two agents which is independent of the economy’s state of development.
6Formally, a quite distinct distance to frontier is reﬂected by values ¯ At−1/At−1 that strongly
exceed unity.
7Formally spoken, the term ¯ At−1/At−1 declines and converges to unity.
94 The macroeconomic equilibrium
From an aggregate perspective, another policy variable which is not included in
(11) gains importance, namely the economy-wide composition of specialists. Due
to the OLG-setting, in each period there are young and old specialists. Their
economy-wide distribution captures the share l of technological specialists and



























Equivalently is average productivity of old ﬁrms, Ao
t , with the sole difference that
















For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that half the specialists are young and half
















This, together with equations (13)–(15) determines an economy’s process of con-














where ˜ s ≡
so+sy
2 represents average investment of old and young ﬁrms.
To close the model, equilibrium growth of productivity at the technology frontier
has to be determined. It may be derived by evaluating (17) at the technology fron-
tier, i.e. by setting at = at−1 = 1, and solving for g. The corresponding equilibrium
growth rate then results as





8This assumption is in accordance with the fact that younger ﬁrms usually are more frequently
credit-constrained than old and well-known ﬁrms are.
10It is a function of individual skills, the shares of technological and systemic spe-
cialists, investment size, and public spendings. All parameters provide the basis
for governmental policy and thus their respective impact for convergence will be
addressed in the following. Notice that productivity growth at the technology
frontier, g∗, is increasing in the government budget, b, but is independent of its
composition, r. This is in strong contrast to an economy’s path of convergence to
the technology frontier, at, which is increasing in both b and r (see (17)).
5 Policy implications
Within the considered framework, the goal of government policy is catching-up of
lagging economies to the technology frontier. One way to achieve this goal is to
enhance productivity of the economy’s labor force as determined by the skill levels
of the heterogenous specialists as well as by their overall distribution. Hence, the
focus of government policy is laid on education policy determined by the skill
levels of the heterogenous spec which includes various policy parameters.
Perspective of the single specialist: In this context, all components affecting indi-
vidual productivity are of interest. They include investment size as well as those
parameters related to individual skills, i. e. structure and amount of the public
budget (see (8)). Higher investment sizes (e. g. via easier access to private capi-
tal) unequivocally spur the specialists’ productivity thereby affecting technological
and systemic skills uniformly.9 Referring to government expenditure, the analysis
is a bit more sophisticated. It includes skill-enhancing education as a consequence
of either higher public spendings and/or reorganization of the existing public bud-
get. Similar to higher investments, individual productivity unequivocally increases
with the amount of the public budget. However, the structure of public expendi-
ture highlights on which type of skill emphasis is laid by the government. Given
the polar case r = 0, public expenditure act solely as enhancing systemic skills
and reference point is then local knowledge, At−1. In the other polar case, r = 1,
only technological skills are affected by government policy which thus is linked to
global knowledge, ¯ At−1. Intermediate values 0 < r < 1 refer to policies that affect
9Notice that enhancing private investment does not necessarily require government intervention
in the sense of relaxing possibly existing credit market imperfections or via investment subsidies.
We do not detail this aspect here since emphasis is not laid on the sources of higher productivity
but on the consequences of higher productivity on catching-up.
11both technological and systemic skills though to varying extents with increasing
relative importance of technological (systemic) skills as r increases (decreases).
Economy-wide perspective: Aside from enhancing individual skills, education pol-
icy also includes the choice of the relative shares of technological and systemic
specialists. This decision is independent of amount and structure of the public
budget. The impact on the process of catching-up is captured within (17). No-
tice that one also has to consider that, since the impact of the government budget
is magniﬁed by an economy’s distance to frontier, the corresponding impact of r
is likewise affected: The relative contribution of technological and systemic skills
varies throughout the process of convergence, and systemic skills become the more
important the closer an economy is to the technology frontier (recall the discussion
in the context of (11)).
From a formal point of view, the analysis conducts sensitivity analysis of the equa-
tion of motion (7) with respect to the government parameters (b, r, l) and to
investment (s) in order to derive the single effect of any policy. Due to comple-
mentarity between the skills on the one hand and investment (s) and government
budget (b, r) on the other hand, any policy unequivocally enhances productivity
of a single specialist, though to different extents.
In order to assess the absolute strengths of the various policy instruments, aside
from partial derivatives, we also focus on productivity differentials thereby ﬁrst
comparing higher investment to higher public expenditure and then confronting
the impact of increasing the public budget to reorganizing its structure. In ad-
dition, the impact of changes of the overall composition of specialists, l, will be
analyzed thereby capturing the aggregate perspective of government policy.
In what follows, the focus will be laid on determining those policies that speed
up convergence of an economy to the technology frontier. Given a certain state
of development, at−1 (within (17)), that policy will be preferred that results in a
higher level at. In doing so, attention will be given to two different perspectives:
(i) Isolated policy of a single country that considers productivity growth at the tech-
nology frontier, and hence g∗ in (18), as exogenous; and (ii) coordinated policies,
thereby taking into account feedback effects of government policies on the equi-
librium growth rate, g∗. The following analysis highlights that the impact of any
government policy may vary between the two mentioned contexts and details the
underlying economic mechanisms. It turns out that depending upon the structural
parameters, it might be necessary to realize a policy switch considering the most
12effective policy instrument during the process of catching up.10 To substantiate
the arguing some selected simulation plots are provided.
6 Isolated policy
6.1 The impact of various policy instruments
We now detail how the various policy instruments namely investment size, amount
and structure of the public budget as well as the economy-wide composition of spe-
cialists affect an economy’s speed of convergence. Formally, the latter is measured
by the level of the partial derivatives of the equation of motion (17) with respect
to the considered parameter. Throughout this section we assume that productivity
growth at the technology frontier, g∗, is considered as being exogenous. This al-
lows us to interpret the consequences of choices of instruments as isolated policy
of the considered economy.
It is straightforward that both higher government expenditures and bigger invest-
ment sizes enhance productivity of the specialists and thus speed up convergence.



















t−1 > 0 (19b)
In both cases, in the context of isolated policies the parameter g reﬂects productiv-
ity growth at the technology frontier which is considered to be exogenous. The re-
sulting effect on convergence increases with a country’s state of development, at−1,
or, put differently, decreases as the economy approaches the technology frontier.
Hence, although the sign of both policies is unequivocally positive, the strength of
the effect is weakened throughout the process of convergence thereby reﬂecting
decreasing returns of the mentioned instruments, s and b.
10Notice that this is another perspective than the one discussed by Acemoglu et al. (2006) who
compare the impact of innovation and imitation strategies that are carried out by the individual
ﬁrms are compared to each other.





13Considering the impact of the government budget structure and its contribution








t−1 lnat−1 | {z }
−
> 0 (20)
As argued before, education policy might also focus on the aggregate perspective
in the sense that the government decides on the relative shares of technological
and systemic specialists, respectively, as measured by l. Again it turns out that the
state of development of a country is of major importance for the corresponding
effect on convergence. It follows
¶at
¶l
≷ 0 ⇐⇒ at−1 ≶
¯ h−h
¯ g−g
≡ ˜ a (21)
The state of development ˜ a from (10) reﬂects the threshold that, all other things
beingequal, separates the productivity advantageof technological specialists (given at−1 <
˜ a) and systemic specialists (given at−1 > ˜ a) as illustrated in Figure 1. Applying this
(individual) argument to the (aggregate) level of the economy highlights that in-
creasing the share of technological specialists, l, only speeds up convergence if
a country’s state of development falls short of ˜ a. After having passed the thresh-
old level ˜ a, a policy switch which incorporates a shift from more technological to
systemic specialists should be realized.12
An illustration of the results in (19a)–(20) is provided by Figures 2 – Figure 4. All
ﬁgures plot the relationships for two different structures of the government budget
as represented by the parameters r = 0.3 (dashed functions) and r = 0.7 (solid
functions) as well as for various extents of the public budget (see ﬁgures (a)–(c)).
As argued in the context of (11) the impact of the government budget decreases
as an economy converges to the technology frontier. This effect is the stronger the
more emphasis is laid on enhancing technological skills, i. e. the higher r. As a
consequence, the solid functions always run above the dashed functions. We now
detail the impact of the single policies on the speed of convergence.
The impact of investment, ¶at
¶s , Figure 2: Higher investment of either old or young
specialists enhances productivity equally (see also footnote 11). A positive ef-
fect already arises for an initial state of development equal to at−1 = 0. With the
12However, if one thinks about l as reﬂecting a certain existing education system it becomes
obvious that the corresponding effects would only becomes effective in the intermediate run and
hence one might doubt the reasonability of such a policy.
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Figure 2: Investment and convergence
parameters: ˜ s=0.75, g=0.02 (exogenous), l=0.5, ¯ h=0.6, h=0.5, ¯ g=0.6, g=0.4
dashed function: r = 0.3, solid function: r = 0.7
exceptions of the two boundary values at−1 = 0 and at−1 = 1 where dashed and
dotted functions intersect, the extent is stronger for high values of r. The level
of investment, s, affects technological and systemic skills equally. Formally, this
results from the fact that investment sizes are outside the brackets in (8). Since
investment and government spendings are complementary, the impact of more in-
vestment on the speed of convergence increases with the size of the government
budget. This can be seen within the derivative in (19a) which is a function of
budget size, b, and illustratively by comparing Figures 2(a) – 2(c).
The impact of the budget size, ¶at
¶b, Figure 3: Increasing the public budget size en-
hances the speed of convergence which results as a function of the project sizes,
productivity growth at the technology frontier, a country’s state of development,
and of the government budget structure. But it is independent of its absolute
level, b (see (19b)).13 Hence the positive effect of a bigger governmental budget
on the speed of convergence holds for all prevailing public budget sizes. Again,
with the exceptions of at−1 = 0 and at−1 = 1 where again dashed and dotted func-
tions intersect, the effect is more pronounced for high values of r. In the extreme
case of at−1 = 0, enhancing public expenditure doesn’t speed up convergence (see
Figure 3).14
The impact of the budget structure, ¶at
¶r, Figure 4: From (20) and the illustrations
in Figure 4 it becomes obvious that increasing r has a positive but non-monotonic
impact on the speed of convergence. Generally speaking, higher levels of r imply
a stronger emphasis on technological skills that are linked to productivity at the
13Notice that the shares of specialists doesn’t affect the speed of convergence.
14This result is in contrast to the afore analyzed impact of investment.











Figure 3: Government expenditures and convergence
parameters: ˜ s = 0.75, g = 0.02 (exogenous), ¯ h = 0.6, h = 0.5, ¯ g = 0.6, g = 0.4
dashed function: r = 0.3, solid function: r = 0.7
technology frontier and which increase with the budget size. Increasing r thus
enhances productivity in the considered economy and the effect is strongest for
intermediate states of development.
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(c) b = 0.7
Figure 4: Structure of the government budget and convergence
parameters: ˜ s = 0.75, g = 0.02 (exogenous), ¯ h = 0.6, h = 0.5, ¯ g = 0.6, g = 0.4
dashed: r = 0.3, solid function: r = 0.7
The intuition for this is as follows: If at−1 is small, productivity in the consid-
ered economy is low. This impedes vast realization of productivity advances. If in
contrast, an economy is quite well developed in the sense of high values of at−1,
the differential between the economy’s productivity and productivity at the tech-
nology frontier is not very pronounced. Additionally, the relative importance of
technological skills, which are strengthened by increases in r, diminishes as the
economy converges to the technology frontier. Consequently, the more public ex-
penditures are focused on the utilization of the high productivity at the technology
frontier, the higher is the corresponding productivity gain of increasing the related
technological skills. This gain is maximal for intermediate levels of development,
namely if the state of development already allows for ’learning’ from the technol-
ogy frontier and when at the same time the distance to frontier is still signiﬁcant
16enough to realize productivity gains.15
6.2 Assessment of alternative policies
From a policy view, the crucial question is to which extent each of the afore dis-
cussed instruments speeds up convergence and with this to assess alternative pub-
lic policies. In doing so, we derive productivity differentials thereby comparing
higher investment to higher budget sizes, higher budget sizes to restructuring a
given budget, and restructuring the public budget to reorganizing the shares of
specialists. In doing so, we assume that speeding up the process of convergence is
the pursued policy goal. Anyway, we do not assess the derived policy instruments
according to a socialwelfare function that is maximized by a political actor. To sup-
port the argumentation, the corresponding plots of the differentials are included
in Figures 5–7. It becomes apparent that policy recommendations depend upon
a country’s state of development and that for certain parameter constellations a
policy switch with respect to the chosen instrument might be advised throughout
the process of convergence.
Investment size versus amount of public expenditure, ¶at
¶s − ¶at
¶b: As argued before,
both higher investment and a bigger government budget speed up convergence
though to different extents. Comparing the single effects via considering produc-
tivity differentials leads to the relationships displayed in Figures 5(a) – 5(c).
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Figure 5: Investment vs. amount of the governmental budget
parameters: ˜ s=0.75, g=0.02 (exogenous), ¯ h=0.6, h=0.5, ¯ g=0.6,g=0.4, l=0.5
dashed: r = 0.3, solid function: r = 0.7
15Notice that the discussed results are independent of the shares of specialists.
17For low levels of the government budget (b = 0.3), no unambiguously dominat-
ing policy recommendation may be derived (see Figure 5(a)): Poorly developed
economies beneﬁt more from higher investment, whereas more developed regions
display a faster convergence process if public expenditures are extended in order
to enhance skills. This result basically holds for both displayed structures of the
public budget, r = 0.3 and r = 0.7. Both the dashed and the dotted functions
intersect the horizontal axis thereby implying that after having passed a certain
state of development, as indicated by the intersection of the non-linear functions
with the horizontal axis, the economy should realize a policy switch from increas-
ing investment to increasing public expenditure. Such a switch in the preferable
policy is due to the changing relative importance of technological and systemic
skills throughout the process of convergence whereas higher investment enhances
productivity uniformly throughout the process of convergence. As argued before,
higher investments increase productivity with respect to both technological and
systemic skills. Productive spendings instead augment productivity depending on
the prevailing budget structure. Hence, the critical value of the technology level,
which separates the ranges of dominance of any policy, decreases with an increase
in r. The reason is that an increase in r means a restructuring of the government
budget in favor of technological skills which become relatively less important as
a country catches up. Figure 5(c) shows the impact of the same policy options
on the convergence process but for a already high public budget. Since govern-
ment expenditures are already high, the gain from an additional increase in the
government share is smaller. Besides, the productivity gain which results from an
increase in individual investment sizes is large, as it leads to relatively high indi-
vidual productivity. Hence, for all states of development, an increase in investment
induces a faster catching-up process than a corresponding increase in productive
government spendings.
Amount versus structure of the government budget, ¶at
¶r − ¶at
¶b: Comparing the impact
of a higher r vs. a higher b leads to the question if either a restructuring of an
existing budget or its enhancement given a certain budget structure contributes
more to speeding-up convergence. Figures 6(a)–6(c) plot the corresponding pro-
ductivity differentials, ¶at
¶r − ¶at
¶b, again for alternative amounts of the governmental
budget, b, and for different compositions, r. The underlying partial derivatives
are only functions of investment, so and sy, productivity growth at the technology
frontier, g, as well as of the government budget parameter, r and b. Neither in-
dividual skills nor the overall composition of specialists affects these results and
18non-monotonic relationships characterize the productivity differentials.
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Figure 6: Structure vs. amount of the governmental budget
parameters: ˜ s, ¯ h = 0.6, h = 0.5, ¯ g = 0.6,g = 0.4, l = 0.5 g = 0.02
dashed: r = 0.3, solid function: r = 0.7
The following becomes obvious: The productivity differentials are positive as long
as an economy is poorly developed, and negative for economies close to the tech-
nology frontier. The according threshold state of development results from(19b)




It is graphically illustrated by the intersection between the non-monotonic func-
tions and the horizontal axis in 6(a)–6(c). Accordingly, for lagging economies, re-
structuring the government budget according to a higher r is the preferred conver-
gence policy whereas economies with a state of development beyond the threshold
value should instead increase the budget size. This implies an unambiguous rec-
ommendation of a policy switch from restructuring a given governmental budget
for poorly developed economies to then increasing higher public expenditures af-
ter having passed a certain threshold state of development as determined by (22).
Comparing Figures 6(a)–6(c) highlights that the corresponding threshold is in-
creasing in b thereby making a restructuring of the public budget the favorite
policy for even a wider range of states of development. To understand this result
one must look at the mechanism that drives convergence: A higher value of r
acts like enhancing technological skills. Their contribution to convergence is the
higher the less developed a region is. After having passed a certain degree of
development this productivity enhancing effect is reduced while the productivity
enhancing effect of a higher b becomes relatively more important. If b is small the
19marginal contribution of a higher budget dominates the marginal contribution of
a restructuring for most states of development since the threshold level of devel-
opment is very small. Since it increases with b, restructuring the budget becomes
than reasonable for a wider range of development.
For low levels of r as represented by the dashed function, the differentials are
not so distinct as for high r as represented by the solid function. This implies
that changes of both parameters have quite similar (positive) extents. However,
for high levels of r a further increase even more fosters convergence compared
to increasing the budget. This predominance is reinforced as the governmental
budget increases. Again the reason for this result lies in the strong contribution
of all activities that act as enhancing technological skills as long as a country is
poorly developed.
Restructuring the public budget vs. restructuring the composition of specialists, ¶at
¶r −
¶at
¶l: Figure 7 compares the impact of a change in the structure of the public budget
to a change of the composition of specialists. For all states of development, an
increase in r contributes more to speeding up convergence than an increase in
l. Economies far away from the technology frontier experience a productivity
gain from both policy measures. Yet the productivity shift which results from a
restructuring of the public budget is larger. Economies close to the technology
frontier still proﬁt from a rise in r. Simultaneously, as their state of development
exceeds the threshold level ˜ a, convergence is slowed down by means of an increase
in the share of technological specialists. Hence, an increase in the weight given
to productivity at the technology frontier, r, is unambiguously preferable to an
increase in the share of technological specialists.
7 Coordinated policies
The analysis in the preceding section assumes that only the considered economy
realizes the respective policy. In this section we will contrast the outcomes with
the setting where the policies of different countries are coordinated. For example,
countries pertaining to the European Union could generate common policies in or-
der to foster convergence. A common policy to increase government expenditure,
for instance, then would enhance not only the productivity within a single country
but if feedback effects the economies’ policies are considered, also productivity
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Figure 7: Structure of the government budget vs. composition of specialists
parameters: ˜ s, ¯ h = 0.6, h = 0.5, ¯ g = 0.6,g = 0.4, l = 0.5
dashed: r = 0.3, solid function: r = 0.7
at the technology frontier. This can crucially affect the outcomes referring to the
convergence speed discussed before.
Recall that the equilibrium growth rate at the technology frontier, is given by (18).











which describes an economy’s distance to frontier given that all involved countries
implement the same policy measures.








Of course, relaxing capital market frictions still enhances productivity. But in the
setting of coordinated policy, the positive productivity effect applies to all countries
equally thereby leaving the convergence process unaffected.
The impact of a coordinated rise in productive government spendings, b, is dis-
played in Figures 8(a) to 8(c). Productivity is increased due to the rise in govern-
ment expenditures. But again the productivity increase in the considered country
is accompanied by a productivity increase in all other countries. Moreover, the
positive productivity effect is less pronounced for less developed regions and more
pronounced for higher r, see Figure 3. The overall effect on the convergence
process hence depends on the country’s state of development. Regions with low
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Figure 8: Coordinated policies
assumed parameters: so = 1, sy = 0.5, ¯ h = 0.6, h = 0.5, ¯ g = 0.6, g = 0.4, l = 0.5;
dashed: r = 0.3, solid function: r = 0.7
technology levels will loose from a coordinated rise in b, where as the convergence
speed of regions with higher technology levels will increase.
With respect to the structure of governmental activity, r, the essential results re-
main unchanged. The gain from restructuring the governmental budget in favor
of high productivity at the technology frontier is largest for intermediate levels of
development, as can be seen in Figures 8(d) to 8(f). The reason is that growth at
the technology frontier is not inﬂuenced by the composition of governmental ac-
tivity. Nevertheless, the comparison between the effectiveness of restructuring the
governmental budget, r, versus an enlargement of governmental activity, b, now
is unambiguous: Figures 8(g) to 8(i) show that for all levels of development, a
coordinated increase in r unequivocally induces higher convergence speed than a
22coordinated increase in governmental activity. This outcome is due to the fact that
a coordinate increase in b has less effect on convergence than an isolated increase
in b as explained above.
In contrast to the ambiguous impact of an isolated increase in the share of tech-
nological specialists analyzed in the previous section, a coordinated increase in
l unambiguously accelerates convergence. As already mentioned above, produc-
tivity of countries with development levels below ˜ a is increased. Simultaneously,
productivity of countries with development beyond ˜ a is decreased. Since the slow-
down in growth is the larger, the more developed a country is, a coordinated
increase in the share of technological specialists unambiguously increases conver-
gence speed as displayed in ﬁgures 9(a) to 9(c). Correspondingly, ﬁgures 9(d) to
9(f) compare a change in the structure of the governmental budget with a change
in the composition of specialists. The result is the same as already achieved above:
An increase in r unambiguously leads to an increase in convergence speed, inde-
pendent from the development level of the considered country.
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Figure 9: Structure of the government budget vs. composition of specialists
parameters: ˜ s0 = 1, sy = 0.5, ¯ h = 0.6, h = 0.5, ¯ g = 0.6,g = 0.4, l = 0.5
dashed: r = 0.3, solid function: r = 0.7
238 Conclusions
In a model with different types of highly skilled specialists we show that con-
vergence can be supported by various government policies. We focus on easier
access to investment, an increase in government spendings, a restructuring of the
government budget and a change in the composition of specialists. An increase
in productive public expenditure fosters productivity of both types of specialists
thereby increasing growth of the considered economy. The structure of the gov-
ernment budget determines the weight of productivity at the technology frontier
versus productivity in the respective economy. More weight on the productivity
at the technology frontier unambiguously accelerates convergence. An increase in
the share of technological specialists, e. g. via a change in the education system,
induces ambiguous effects on the catching up process. If the development level is
below a threshold value, convergence is accelerated. If the development level is
relatively high, convergence speed is reduced.
In comparing the effectiveness of the different policy measures we ﬁnd several
parameter settings in which policy switches are preferable. A country with a quite
low development level can realize a faster convergence process by an increase in
the investment size than by an increase in government budget. If the government
share is not too high, this preferable policy changes as the economy approaches
the technology frontier. Countries with a higher development level will gain more
from an increase in government activity than from a rise in investment size. The
same argument applies to the amount and the structure of government expen-
ditures. Poorly developed economies gain more from restructuring an existing
public budget whereas economies close to the technology frontier will proﬁt from
an expansion of government expenditures.
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